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ON DISARMAMENT**

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE ONE HUNDRED AND NINETY-SIXTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 7 July 1964 at 10.30 a.m.

THE UNIVERSITY
OF MICHIGAN

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DOCUMENT
COLLECTION

Chairman:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

(Mexico)

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Miss L. de VINCENZI

Mr. E. HOSANNAH

Bulgaria:

Mr. C. LUKANOV

Mr. G. GHELEV

Mr. T. DAMIANOV

Mr. I. BOEV

Burma:

U SAIN BWA

U. HTOON SHE IN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. R.M. TAIT

Mr. C.J. MARSHALL

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. V. PECHOTA

Mr. V. VAJNAR

Mr. A. MIKULIN

Mr. J. CHMELA

Ethiopia:

Lij Mikael IMRU

Ato S. TEFERRA

India

Mr. R.K. NEHRU

Mr. K.P. LUKOSE

Mr. K. NARENDRANATH

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVELLETTI

Mr. E. GUIDOTTI

Mr. S. AVETTA

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

Mexico:

Mr. A. GOMEZ ROBLEDO

Mr. M. TELLO

Mr. J. MERCADO

Nigeria:

Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. LACHS

Mr. E. STANIEWSKI

Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI

Romania:

Mr. V. DUMITRESCU

Mr. E. GLASER

Mr. C. UNGUREANU

Mr. I. IACOB

Sweden

Mr. P. HAMMARSKJOLD

Mr. B. VEGESACK

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

Mr. S.K. TSARAPKIN

Mr. L.I. MENDELYEVICH

Mr. S.A. BOGOMOLOV

Mr. E.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN

Mr. A. OSMAN

Mr. M. KASSEM

Mr. A.A. SALAM

United Kingdom:

Sir Paul MASON

Mr. J.G. TAHOURDIN

Mr. J.M. EDES

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (Cont'd)

United States of America:

Mr. C.H. TIMBERLAKE

Mr. D.S. MACDONALD

Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Miss M.R. de GUNZBURG

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): I declare open the one hundred and ninety-sixth meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

I must first extend a most cordial welcome to the Soviet representative, Ambassador Tsarapkin, who is resuming his functions at the head of his delegation, and to Ambassador Timberlake, who will be leading the United States delegation. I am sure that their collaboration will contribute to the success of our labours.

In my capacity as Mexican representative I should like to say a few introductory words about the subject before us: the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles. As we see it, whatever the steps and methods ultimately adopted, this is an essential phase in the process of general and complete disarmament, and thus merits our closest attention. We likewise see that a solution to this problem is more than ever a matter of urgency, since nuclear weapons have reached a level which without exaggeration can be called terrifying--a level which, to quote from the Indian representative's speech on 30 June "is very much above the minimum level needed for genuine security or for deterrence". (ENDC/PV.194, p.9) Those are words which command general acceptance.

The choice between total annihilation and the fulfilment of man's higher destiny presents itself in international life with ever-increasing immediacy and force. Thus the security of the nuclear Powers is not the point at issue--or, at any rate, not the only one; the point at issue is the threat to all mankind. Hence every man has the right to speak his mind on the subject, and not least in this Committee, the representative of a State which, as everyone knows, has indefatigably supported the denuclearization of enormous geographical areas.

In our happy position as a non-nuclear Power not aligned with any of the nuclear Powers--and we shall always remain in that position, however much we may develop economically--we merely wish to appeal to the wisdom and common sense of those bearing the greatest responsibility in this field, in order that they may agree among themselves on the best means of achieving an object about which there can be no discussion. As the proverb says, where there's a will there's a way, particularly when the goal is nothing less than the survival of the human race. We have therefore greatly welcomed the idea of creating a working group to study the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles to a figure which would maintain the necessary balance between the nuclear Powers and speedily eliminate the threat to all mankind.

(The Chairman, Mexico)

When we use certain terms, such as those I have just employed, we do not intend to give them a special value which could link them to any of the concrete proposals that have been debated between the nuclear Powers. We regard ourselves as above and beyond the rigid connotation which might be attributed by either side to terms such as "percentage" or "minimum". Either way, we should achieve the same result. If we do not misunderstand the Indian representative, he had this in mind when he said on 30 June, that the keynote of his country's proposal was "the reduction of existing stocks of nuclear delivery vehicles on both sides to a less dangerous level, or to a level needed solely for the purpose of deterrence ..." (ENDC/PV.194, p.10). That is exactly how we see it.

Our hope of an ultimate agreement on the working group's terms of reference -- which must, in our view, be both precise and flexible, for we see no logical incompatibility between the two -- is based on both sides' speeches during this session, which, notwithstanding many divergencies, give evidence of common ground regarding the need for such a body and also its minimum requirements. In this connexion I shall merely quote two statements which I consider to be very significant. The Italian representative, Mr. Cavalletti, speaking about the term "nuclear umbrella" -- in Spanish I prefer the word sombrilla, since it does not carry a connotation of thunderstorms -- said on 7 April:

"If this term means that, at a given stage of the disarmament process, only a fixed and strictly limited quantity of atomic weapons would remain on one side and the other, we could then say that there was agreement in principle on this point." (ENDC/PV.181, p.46)

The Bulgarian representative, Mr. Lukanov, said on 23 June:

"As everyone knows, the idea of beginning disarmament with the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles was originally put forward by one of the Western Powers members of NATO. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries gave this idea a concrete form because it opens up an effective possibility of eliminating the nuclear danger with due regard to the security interests of all countries ..." (ENDC/PV.192, p.9)

(The Chairman, Mexico)

Hence we feel that we can speak of common ground. I must stress that we give our unconditional support only to the idea; nevertheless, this in itself represents considerable progress, since, as Plato put it with the intuition of genius, practical realities sooner or later adjust themselves to the idea. For the same reason, still on a plane transcending specific details, we gladly subscribe to the statement made by the Nigerian representative, Mr. Obi, on 23 June:

"Thus my delegation sees no difficulty in approving the substance of the Gromyko proposal or indeed of even a more radical plan, provided that that would rid the world of the present nuclear nightmare in a manner which would not dangerously upset the balance of power during the process of general and complete disarmament." (ibid., p.17)

Since there is agreement on the idea but disagreement over the means of implementing it, a compromise would seem to be the only possible course, as the Bulgarian representative, Mr. Lukanov, said at the same meeting:

"It cannot be doubted that in order to achieve this purpose there must be endeavours, a spirit of compromise, and a desire to move forward ..."

(ibid., p.3)

We believe that the spirit of compromise and a desire to move forward must be shown at all times by both sides. The Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, said in the same vein on 9 June:

"A unilateral solution of the disarmament problem is just as impossible as unilateral disarmament." (ENDC/PV.188, p.16)

With that background and the firm basis which it provides, we do not feel that our fervent appeal to the Powers concerned will fall on deaf ears, and we think that they will be able to work out among themselves suitable terms of reference for the proposed working group to study the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

The peoples of the world do not wish to live under the shadow of the nuclear menace. The great Powers appear to feel that their security depends on the "nuclear umbrella". Our own security, that of the non-nuclear countries, depends more on the destruction of all nuclear weapons than on the retention of such a minimum.

Mr. DUMITRESCU (Romania) (translation from French): I should like first of all to welcome back among us Mr. Tsarapkin, who as head of the Soviet delegation has just resumed his functions as co-Chairman of our Committee.

The Romanian delegation has followed with particular attention the debates on the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. The fact that the two co-Chairmen have agreed to devote our first meeting to precisely this aspect of the problem constitutes, in our opinion, yet further recognition of an already long established truth: that, however we approach the problem of disarmament, we shall be forced to return time and again to the essential element, to the core of the whole problem--nuclear disarmament.

We have analyzed most carefully the proposals submitted on this question to our Committee, and we have had occasion to set forth our position regarding them. When deciding upon its position, the Romanian delegation endeavoured to analyze objectively the existing proposals and declared itself in favour of those which, in its opinion, were likely to achieve the fulfilment of our terms of reference as quickly as possible.

It is on the basis of these considerations that our delegation, on the Romanian Government's instructions, has declared itself in favour of the speediest elimination of the mere possibility of unleashing and waging a nuclear war. Of course, the radical solution would be to destroy, from the outset of the process of general and complete disarmament, all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, and even all nuclear weapons, at the very first stage, if the Western Powers would agree to such a course. Clearly such a measure should not be taken in isolation but should be accompanied by a substantial reduction in other armaments and in the levels of armed forces.

It would not be realistic to approach the problem in such a way as to create a so-called balance of deterrents which would be intended, in reality, to ensure unilateral advantages for one of the parties at some stage of the disarmament process. That kind of action would be doomed to failure from the outset. As we have had occasion to stress, unilateral advantages could not, nowadays promote disarmament. On the contrary, they constitute a factor which stimulates the arms race. Peace and

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

disarmament can only be based upon guaranteed security for all parties. The equal right of all States to security, also laid down in the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5), must therefore be fully safeguarded during the disarmament process.

It is precisely for this reason that our delegation, like all the other socialist and many other delegations, has declared itself in favour of the principle which is at the basis of the Gromyko proposal (ENDC/2/Rev.1/Add.1) and which, as has often been stressed, represents an effort made in the spirit of negotiation to facilitate an agreement on the question of the principle of the disarmament process.

The elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles from the very start of the process of general and complete disarmament, except those mentioned in the Soviet proposal, even if it would not remove every danger of a nuclear war, would substantially reduce the danger that a war might break out by miscalculation, by accident or by surprise attack. It would also put an end to the nuclear arms race.

The representative of India, Mr. R. K. Nehru, stated at our meeting on 30 June:

"While nuclear armaments seem to form an integral part of the mix of weapons and defence structures of the nuclear Powers, I am sure we will all agree that they fall into a special category. They have a special purpose and character which distinguish them from other types of armaments. For the first time in man's history a weapon has been created which cannot easily be used. In fact, if used at all, this must inevitably lead to mutual suicide and annihilation. We cannot imagine any international problem which exists at present or may arise in future to which such a solution can be applied." (ENDC/PV.194, p.8)

Those are very wise words. If we want to advance the preparation of the treaty on general and complete disarmament beyond the point at which it has been for so long, we must be very specific and agree on the necessity of taking precisely that truth as the point of departure. As you know, it is on the same lines that some other delegations have spoken, for example, your delegation, Mr. Chairman, the delegations of Ethiopia and Nigeria, and others.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

At our meeting on 30 June the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, introduced (ibid., pp. 28 et seq.) in connexion with the Soviet Government's proposal some new elements which have been acclaimed as fresh proof of the Soviet delegation's conciliatory spirit, of which some other members of the Committee have also spoken. It appears to us highly desirable that the other side, in its turn, should demonstrate the same spirit. Thus there would be created conditions more favourable for undertaking a detailed analysis of the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, even if, as the representative of India, Mr. B. K. Nehru, said on 30 June, "for technical or political reasons an early agreement may not be easy". (ibid., p.6).

I should now like to speak briefly about certain points which have emerged in our examination of the procedure to be followed in order to crystallize our negotiations in this field, and which concern the usefulness of setting up a special working group.

The Romanian delegation, as I also pointed out on 25 June at the 193rd meeting, supports the idea that our Conference's business should be organized more systematically so that we can embark upon a more effective study of the problems before us (ENDC/PV.193, p.15). In our view, our Committee's composition ensures a completely objective examination of the problems which will arise within the working group. The working group, as an auxiliary body, will act under the general guidance of the Committee and report regularly to it (as was done, for example, by the committee on collateral measures), thereby making it easier for us to examine and adopt decisions with a full knowledge of the facts. The delegations will thus have the necessary information, on the basis of which they will be able in due course to request instructions from their Governments.

Agreement must, however, be reached on one essential point, namely the meaning which we attach to the agreement of principle necessary to eliminate nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. At the meeting of 30 June Mr. Zorin said "the Gromyko proposal is only a proposal of principle." (ENDC/PV.194. p.32) The entire problem of the elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles should be discussed on the basis of the principle of retaining a minimum quantity, or rather, a certain proportion of these vehicles in order to ensure the security of both sides.

(Mr. Dumitrescu, Romania)

The statements made by the representative of the Soviet Union show how unfounded is the view that attention would be confined to one of the proposals, to the exclusion of others which are also in accordance with this principle. What is necessary to ensure progress in our negotiations is an agreement on the speediest possible elimination of all nuclear weapons, all other weapons of mass destruction, and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. In our opinion, whatever procedure we adopt in our negotiations on this issue, we must bear in mind the considerations which guided the United Nations when it set up the Committee and assigned it its terms of reference (A/RES/1722(XVI)).

Mr. CAVALLETTI (Italy) (translation from French): First of all, I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome tendered by you, Mr. Chairman, and the Romanian representative to Mr. Tsarapkin and Mr. Timberlake, our present co-Chairmen. I wish them every success in their work in this Committee.

My delegation has always favoured a thorough technical and scientific study of the problems before this Conference. On a previous occasion, for instance, it advocated the creation of a committee of scientists to study the question of nuclear tests. We also warmly supported the Brazilian delegation's proposal for setting up a special working group to study control problems (ENDC/PV.188, p.9). As we indicated on 16 June, our delegation is in favour of establishing a working group to study the problems involved in the reduction and elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles (ENDC/PV.190, p.15). We consider that such a working group would be of great value for the thorough study of that important problem. Our delegation therefore followed with some anxiety the course of the debate last Tuesday, during which the Soviet delegation appeared to insist on certain preliminary conditions to the establishment of such a group (ENDC/PV.194, p.33). That insistence could cause dangerous confusion. In my view, the problem is perfectly clear and straightforward.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

During our discussions on general and complete disarmament, a question of especial importance arose, that of nuclear delivery vehicles, which constitute an extremely dangerous element in present-day arsenals. Hence we must devise a system for reducing as quickly as possible the number of these vehicles, with a view to their total elimination. This progressive elimination should be carried out within the framework of the treaty on general and complete disarmament, which would be divided into three stages. It would of course be a very complex process and would call for careful study.

We had a long preliminary exchange of views on this subject, but that general discussion did not lead to an agreement; in fact we were about to defer the examination of this problem, which appeared for the time being insoluble. It was then the idea was suggested that we should resume the study of the problem through a working group, in order to widen our technical knowledge and explore possible solutions on a more practical level. Having been put forward by the Soviet Union (ENDC/PV.188, p.17), this suggestion was accepted by the Western delegations, and received a large measure of support from the delegations of the non-aligned countries, notably India, Ethiopia and Mexico.

However, difficulties arose over the working group's terms of reference. This is certainly a delicate problem, but should not be insoluble if both sides show good will. The working group's task is quite clear -- to devise the most appropriate systems and means for the rapid reduction and ultimate elimination of nuclear vehicles, subject to the Agreed Principles of disarmament. To achieve this object, the Western delegations advanced certain proposals. The Eastern delegations submitted others, to which they gave the name "operation nuclear umbrella". Thus we have two paths which lead to the same destination by different routes. There may even be others. We must select that which turns out to be the most practical, the most realistic and the most in conformity with the fundamental principles of disarmament. That is our task. The working group could help us to perform it.

The West does not insist that its proposals should be adopted as the only working basis. Although we are convinced that our proposals are good ones, in

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

the case of delivery vehicles, as in other cases, we do not refuse to consider -- or submit to the working group for consideration -- any other proposals, whether present or future. We do not claim to have a monopoly of wisdom. It was the West -- to be exact the United Kingdom delegation, I believe -- which once said that the treaty on general and complete disarmament would be neither a Soviet nor an American product, but the result of the joint efforts of the entire Committee, the sum total of the contributions of all delegations present. This is especially true in the case of nuclear delivery vehicles.

If, as I hope, we agree on the creation of a working group, its terms of reference must be as wide and as complete as possible, so that it can, in a free and unfettered manner, seek appropriate solutions with the collaboration of all delegations. The group will have to study one by one all questions relevant to the reduction and elimination of delivery vehicles, compare the various proposed solutions, and appraise them in the light of practical possibilities and the Agreed Principles of disarmament.

There are thus three kinds of problems to study: first, the progressive reduction of the number of delivery vehicles, while maintaining a general balance; secondly, the application of adequate guarantees as to control; thirdly, the progressive establishment within the framework of the United Nations of a collective security system, simultaneously with the destruction of armaments. Under each heading, or at any rate under the first two, the Committee already has before it Western and Eastern proposals. It must compare, appraise and, if possible, reconcile them.

As regards the first point, reduction plus balance, the West considers that the essential balance can, during the disarmament process, be ensured through percentage reductions in all types of weapons. It would be a mistake to envisage the reduction of delivery vehicles as an isolated problem. The reduction or elimination of those vehicles is not a collateral measure, but an important chapter in the treaty on general and complete disarmament. Hence we must not overlook the correlation between nuclear weapons and all the other elements of the treaty, including conventional armaments.

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

I should like to quote in that connexion what the Nigerian representative said on 23 June. He said that there were two cardinal principles.

"The first is that no agreement arrived at here should result, especially during the process of implementation, in a radical disruption of the balance which appears to exist at the moment. This applies not only to the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, but to conventional armaments and other components of present-day military power as well. Indeed, my delegation strongly believes that any agreement which took note of one while ignoring the other would have serious consequences for the realization of our goal. An agreement which would put a Power in the position of being tempted to try even a conventional adventure would not only undermine the realization of our goal but, even with the elimination of nuclear weapons well under way, could lead to a nuclear conflict." (ENDC/PV.192, p.16).

In the same vein, the Indian representative said on 30 June:

"... while we wish to eliminate the danger of nuclear war, we have also to bear in mind the important consideration that our efforts should not give wrong ideas to an adventurist Power, or encourage it to indulge in aggressive activities with its superior conventional forces."

(ENDC/PV.194, p. 8)

Mr. Obi and Mr. Nehru are quite right and it is for the reasons which they mentioned that the Western proposals envisage the reduction, in equal percentages, of all armaments without distinction. The Soviet proposal, on the other hand, makes distinctions. It aims at maintaining the overall balance through the adoption of different criteria for conventional and nuclear weapons, to the latter of which an across-the-board reduction would be applied. The working group should study that particular divergence as a matter of priority.

The most serious obstacle to an agreement is perhaps not, as might at first be thought, the number of delivery vehicles to be retained at a given stage in the disarmament process, but the question of how to determine that number. The number is certainly important, but if we already agree that the number of delivery

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

vehicles will eventually fall to zero, it follows that there will previously be declining levels progressively moving towards zero. We also agree that zero, or the progressively lower levels, should be reached as soon as possible, in accordance with practical possibilities and the Agreed Principles. But the choice of the criterion to be used for reaching zero or figures progressively declining to zero is a matter of great difficulty and uncertainty. That is a problem to which the working group should devote particular attention.

The second point to be examined is that of control. We believe that control should follow disarmament step by step, in the same proportion as disarmament itself, until there is total disarmament and total control. On that latter point the East and the West see eye to eye, for the Eastern delegations, too, accept total control when there is total disarmament. They advocate that controllers shall at that stage have free access to all points in the territory of the country concerned. The difficulty resides in the control measures to be applied in the intermediate stage, between the commencement and the completion of disarmament. When disarmament has been begun but not completed, partial and limited measures must be applied -- not all-embracing, but adequate to afford full guarantees. What should these measures be? The working group should tell us after examining the two sets of proposals on the subject.

The third problem, which the working group will not be able to ignore, is that of the organization of collective security. As you know, we hold that a world without armaments should have a sound collective security organization, which would come under the United Nations and have effective powers of execution. The establishment and development of this organization are closely bound up with the progress of the disarmament process. The more rapid and radical the latter is, the more speedily should the organization be established and developed. Hence, after deciding the rate of destruction of delivery vehicles and other armaments, it will be necessary to study this last problem so as to avoid an imbalance between rapid and far-reaching disarmament and an unduly slow-moving or ineffective world organization.

What matters at present is that the working group should set to work without delay unhampered by disputes over words or pre-conditions. If it is really desired

(Mr. Cavalletti, Italy)

to examine the problem of delivery vehicles thoroughly in order to find an acceptable solution, the working group must obviously enjoy the fullest freedom of research and study, and endeavour to reconcile all divergent views. All delegations, whether aligned or non-aligned, must actively contribute to this work, for the success of which technical data, goodwill, and a conciliatory spirit are quite indispensable. Only thus will the working group justify its existence and lead us to the conclusions we all desire.

Mr. BURNS (Canada): At our 194th meeting and again today we have been discussing the possibility of establishing a working party to go into the details of the problem of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles. The Canadian delegation has listened carefully to the remarks which you, Mr. Chairman, and the representatives of Romania and of Italy have made. We shall be devoting further attention to them when the verbatim record of this meeting is published. However, for the present I should like to review a few of the things that were said at our 194th meeting.

The representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Zorin, towards the end of his remarks said:

"... what we want is ... work founded on the adoption of definite positions of principle, on the basis of which it would be possible to arrive at a concrete technical solution of a whole number of problems that arise ..."

(ENDC/PV.194, p. 34)

The Canadian delegation welcomes this statement, as we have always hoped that the Soviet Union would agree to the working group, or sub-committee, method of procedure.

Mr. Zorin had said earlier:

"But to work to no purpose in a working group when there is no real basis of principle, we consider to be wrong. It would ... create the illusion that something is being done, when we already know beforehand that nothing concrete can come out of the discussion ..." (ibid.)

I think that Mr. Zorin was quite correct on this point. A working group set up without real agreement on its terms of reference would merely waste time. The Committee will perhaps wonder why I have reversed the chronological order of the quotations from Mr. Zorin's remarks. The reason is that I prefer to give the positive position first and the qualification afterwards.

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

On the positive side I should also like to quote Mr. Zorin's enumeration of the matters which the working group should discuss, as given at our meeting of 30 June:

"What this 'umbrella' should be, its characteristics, its expression in terms of quantity, the phases of its elimination, its control and so on are matters we are prepared to discuss.

"... Let us discuss in a working group what the minimum deterrent would be." (ibid., pp.33,34)

The Canadian delegation has several times asked the Soviet delegation to explain its thinking on these matters; and we agree that it would be useful if they could be discussed in a working group.

What blocks agreement on our setting up a working group and getting down to the detailed discussions which will be necessary before we can really understand what the Soviet Union intends by its proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles, excepting the so-called "nuclear umbrella"? We have heard from the United States representative, Mr. Foster, that the United States is willing to discuss the Soviet proposals. But Mr. Zorin told us that the Soviet delegation is not willing to discuss the United States plan for the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles by certain percentages in each stage of disarmament. He said:

"We say that we wish the principle laid down in the Gromyko proposal to be taken as the basis of the activities of the working group. We are prepared to consider proposals which may be in accordance with this principle -- any proposals, provided they are in accordance with this principle: the principle of the retention of a minimum deterrent in the initial stage of disarmament.

"If you agree to this, we are prepared to consider any proposal of yours ... but not a proposal that ... infringes the balance between the two sides." (ibid., p.33)

The representative of India, Mr. Nehru, in his statement at the same meeting, produced, if I may say so, a very skilful synthesis of the positions of the two sides in an effort to find terms of reference which would allow them both to agree to participate in a working group (ibid., pp.11,12). But Mr. Zorin, while appreciative of Mr. Nehru's efforts, and those of other delegations which have tried to find a solution to the terms-of-reference problem, said:

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

"The whole of the discussion this morning shows that there appears to be a desire to find a solution to the question of the basis for the activities of a working group; although, as it seems to us, today's discussion has still not provided a satisfactory answer ..." (ibid., p.29)

The Canadian delegation has been thinking about the problem of finding terms of reference for the working group -- a problem to which other delegations have addressed themselves --, although we have not spoken previously on the topic. We confess that we have not been able to find any solution. However, we have some views on the general subject of the elimination of nuclear weapon vehicles which we should like to place before the Committee.

We wonder if the Soviet delegation cannot reconsider the position expressed by Mr. Zorin that the United States proposal for reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles by percentages throughout the three stages of disarmament, and the Soviet proposal for a very massive reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles in the first stage, must be looked upon as mutually exclusive. Are the ideas, the intentions, which have given rise to these proposals really so opposed that the same working group could not consider both plans -- that of the Soviet Union and that of the United States? It is in relation to the thought that there is not necessarily an ultimate contradiction between the two ideas that I offer the following observations.

Let us start from the point that both sides now have an effective deterrent. It is not necessary to restate and emphasize the importance which the West places on the fact that the present nuclear armament deters war -- any kind of war -- between the alliances which include the nuclear Powers. We have also heard Chairman Khrushchev quoted to the effect that the Soviet Union's nuclear armament is the principal safeguard against aggression, not only for the Soviet Union itself, but for all socialist countries. We are all aware of the dangers and costs created by the existing state of affairs, the existing scale of deterrence, which perhaps we might call a maximum deterrent.

So, in principle, both sides want to stop the arms race and to start reducing the vast arsenal of nuclear weapon vehicles and the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The problem is at what stages during the process of disarmament both sides should reduce to a lesser deterrent, and then to a deterrent at the lowest level which will still be adequate. It must still deter against any kind of war between the great

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

Power blocs, and not only nuclear war. It also seems clear that the reduction of the capacity to wage conventional war must be made concurrently with the reduction of the present great stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles.

Let us turn now to arguments that have been advanced against the United States idea of gradual reduction of the maximum deterrent which we now have, by percentage reductions throughout the process of disarmament. Mr. Zorin has stated that the 30-35-35 per cent formula for the three stages is unacceptable to the Soviet Union. We do not know, however, that these figures are as fixed in their form as, say, the pyramids of Egypt. It is conceivable that in the process of discussion of detail some other formula of percentage reductions which would be acceptable to the Soviet side might emerge.

On 16 June Mr. Zorin told us:

"On 12 June the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev, said at a meeting in connexion with Soviet-German friendship that according to information emanating from United States strategists the United States had accumulated 'so many nuclear weapons that it could kill every Russian three times over. By the word "Russian" they mean "all the people in the Soviet Union". In speaking in that way', Mr. Khrushchev added, 'they do not, however, lose their reason. They admit that the Russians also have as many nuclear bombs as to be able to kill them, but only once.' (ENDC/PV.190, p.30)

Mr. Zorin added:

"... one cannot help wondering whether some people in the United States, trusting in their 'manifold superiority' in regard to the number of intercontinental missiles and bombers, are counting upon changing the situation during the disarmament process in such a way that at some particular moment the United States would still retain the capacity to deal a powerful nuclear blow while the other side would have already been deprived of that capacity." (ibid., pp.30,31)

In a statement made to the Press on 24 June last, Mr. Zorin expanded this explanation of why the Soviet Union rejects the United States percentage plan. In that statement he said, in effect, that if the United States has the power to destroy the Soviet Union three times over, it would still have at the end of the second stage the power to destroy the Soviet Union completely, if reductions of

(Mr. Burns, Canada)

nuclear weapon vehicles were made in accordance with the percentage principle. But, I would ask, must deterrence involve the power to destroy a country completely? Does it not rather consist in the power to cause unacceptable damage? The Soviet Union, according to Mr. Khrushchev, now has sufficient nuclear armament to destroy the United States completely. At the end of the second stage of percentage reductions, it would still be able to destroy one-third of the United States. Think of what that would actually mean. It would mean death for over 60 million American citizens and the destruction of one-third of the wealth, of the productive capacity, of the country.

I ask members of this Committee whether that would not be an effective deterrent. I do not think that anyone in his senses would say that the possession of such power was not an effective deterrent. Of course, these concepts of power relations and destructive capacities are highly generalized and should be taken as mainly for illustrative purposes. However, in replying to Mr. Zorin's argument based on these concepts I do not think that we can arbitrarily say that the putative present differences in power of destruction must necessarily rule out a percentage reduction procedure on the ground that it would rapidly reduce one of the parties, the Soviet Union, to a position where it had not an adequate deterrent against aggression.

Furthermore, we must consider, as has been pointed out several times, that the Soviet Union has certain advantages which must be taken into account in this strategical calculation -- for this problem of what constitutes a deterrent requires a strategical calculation. These Soviet Union advantages are the enormous extent of its territory, the secrecy with which it is able to cloak its military dispositions, the dispersion of its population and industrial base relative to that of the United States. This is another reason why equality in numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles should not be a condition for a minimum deterrent. Another factor which must be taken into account is that the Soviet Union is presumed to possess means of delivering nuclear weapons of very great destructive power, of thirty or more megatons, which would be extremely effective against the many great concentrations of United States industry and population.

I realize that these general remarks on the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles are not immediately relevant to our discussion on finding terms of reference for a working group. According to what was said at the close of the 194th meeting, the co-Chairmen are continuing discussions in the hope of finding

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suitable terms of reference. We all hope that they will succeed. I should like, in any case, to suggest that the Soviet Union and other delegations think over the points which I have made. If, unfortunately, no agreement on the terms of reference of a working group is reached, it should be recognized that there are other methods than the Gromyko "umbrella" for attacking the problem of eliminating nuclear weapon vehicles, and especially of instituting the first steps in this process.

There are a few more points I should like to make before I conclude. First, I should like to say that since the knowledge of how to make nuclear weapons has been attained nothing can make nuclear war impossible. To speak in a more objective and scientific manner, what we have to do is to reduce the probability of the outbreak of nuclear war to a minimum. How are we to do that?

As we have heard in this Committee so many times, the first requisite is that there must be greater confidence between the great nuclear Powers, confidence that neither intends to use its warlike nuclear power to further its political aims. What concrete steps could help to develop that confidence? The Canadian delegation believes that the first steps should be in the direction of checking and then stopping the race in armaments. The proposal of President Johnson (ENDC/120) that there should be a freeze of the production of the most important means of delivery of nuclear weapons seems to us to be capable of being worked out in a way that, while not reducing the efficacy of the existing deterrent, would stop any increase of it. That would be something.

The next step should be to start reducing nuclear weapon vehicles from the level at which they had been frozen. The proposal for the destruction of long-range bombers (ENDC/PV.176, pp.5 et seq.) would be a way of starting on the reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles; and both sides have intimated that they can consider proposals of that kind.

The third condition that must be fulfilled before any real extension of confidence can come about is the acceptance of international inspection to ensure that engagements taken by every party to the disarmament or collateral agreements are being kept.

The fourth condition, which I submit rather tentatively, is that there should be scientific collaboration between the Soviet Union and its allies on the one hand and the United States and its allies on the other. Happily, we have recently seen

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some agreements for such co-operation. We should try to move in the direction of a world in which all scientific discoveries would become the common knowledge of all nations, a world in which scientists would compete with one another in extending the areas of human knowledge for the benefit of humans and not for their destruction.

The Canadian delegation believes that, concurrently with the reduction of armaments, leading towards a minimum deterrent, we must establish better means of settling international disputes. We must establish more effective procedures within the United Nations. Perhaps we ought to say that there must be general agreement to make better use of the existing provisions. It is necessary to be able to settle international differences and threats to peace which might develop into peripheral wars and eventually involve the great Power blocs.

In the view of the Canadian delegation, none of these changes in the present status is likely to come about suddenly through some brilliant and decisive stroke of statesmanship or diplomacy; but we hope that they will happen gradually, perhaps slowly at first but then at an increasing tempo. We know how long it took to attain the agreements of 1963, which have given us hope for an eventual solution to the problems of disarmament. We know that those are only the first steps.

All this is an argument for acceptance of the idea that progress towards the ideal of a disarmed and peaceful world will, in view of the facts of international life, be gradual; it is an argument for some kind of staged, proportional reduction in armaments. We do not say that the percentages now contained in the plan which the West supports are necessarily the final distillation of human wisdom. We all want the probability of nuclear war reduced, and reduced to a far lower level than that at which it now stands — we want it reduced as quickly as is practicable. In the Canadian view, the reduction of the stocks of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon vehicles is likely to be a gradual one. We believe that some variant of the method of proportional reduction of nuclear weapon vehicles as disarmament progresses is the solution which will eventually be adopted.

Mr. TIMBERLAKE (United States of America): First of all, I should like to associate myself with the words of welcome addressed to Mr. Tsarapkin, and also to express my appreciation of the welcome extended to me by you, Mr. Chairman, and by other colleagues who have spoken this morning.

There seems to be general support for the establishment of a working group on nuclear delivery vehicles. There also seems to be a general feeling that the temporary obstacle to finding an agreed basis for the group can be overcome. The thought and the effort devoted by all the members of the Committee to this problem have been reflected in their contributions during recent meetings. I should like to mention especially the statements made last week by the Indian and Ethiopian representatives (ENDC/PV.194).

Ambassador Imru compared our dilemma to the uncomfortable picture of a thirsty horse being refused water (ibid., p.28). We are all anxious to allow the horse to drink. Although the statement made by Mr. Zorin at that meeting does indicate a divergence of views on the matter of the working group, we are not discouraged. As Mr. Foster stated at the same meeting (ibid., p.27), there seem to be sufficient points of agreement to form a basis for the working group.

Mr. Nehru touched on some of these points of agreement: the special importance we all attach to the reduction of nuclear delivery vehicles; our goal of eliminating all such delivery vehicles by the end of stage III of general and complete disarmament; and the necessity of retaining a nuclear shield, or "umbrella" throughout the disarmament process (ibid., p.7). We also agree that the method of reduction of these weapons should be on the basis of the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles (ENDC/5). Mr. Nehru remarked that consideration should be given later to the question of whether the balance of nuclear power at existing levels gives the right kind of security. The determination of the levels of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained at each disarmament stage will be one of the main concerns of the working group. However, in this connexion, I should like to comment on a statement made by the representative of India concerning the level of the present nuclear deterrent.

Mr. Nehru stated that the level of true deterrence had been greatly exceeded; and as evidence he cited a quotation of the late President Kennedy on the danger of nuclear weapons (ENDC/PV.194, pp.8,9). But to stress the danger of these weapons, which we all feel so keenly, is not to say that the existing level of deterrence is

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excessive for its purposes. The danger of nuclear weapons, to which the late President alluded, and the increases in nuclear arsenals, which my delegation has mentioned on several occasions in this Committee, are reflections of the difficult problem we face. We all fully recognize the danger inherent in these terrible weapons, and yet we must continue to refine them and retain them in order to deter any potential aggressor. We must continue to do so until we have been able to agree on a safeguarded, balanced method of reducing these arsenals.

I will now turn to the question of the terms of reference for the proposed working group. There were some parts of Mr. Zorin's statement last week which we found encouraging. It now seems generally agreed that a working group should concentrate on practical questions and should not engage in meaningless discussions. We were interested to hear Mr. Zorin state that his delegation did not insist on acceptance of the Gromyko plan as a proposal; but he then confused us by declaring that the principle of the Gromyko plan was the only acceptable basis for the group's discussion (*ibid.*, p.33). At the same time he told us that the Gromyko plan was not a specific proposal at all but a proposal of principle (*ibid.*, p.32). This perhaps explains why our questions regarding the details of the Gromyko plan have so far been left unanswered. Even so, the Committee should not be asked to accept the Soviet proposal as the exclusive basis for the working group's discussions.

As we stated last week, we do not insist that the Western plan should be the only one considered by the group. We agree with our Nigerian, Indian and Ethiopian colleagues that all relevant proposals should be considered.

We have all agreed that some nuclear delivery vehicles should be retained until the end of stage III. It would be for the working group to determine the level of nuclear weapons -- or what has been called the "nuclear umbrella" -- to be retained at any given stage.

Mr. Zorin himself rightly stated that the group should consider the levels and features composing a "nuclear umbrella", as well as matters related to reduction and control. He then seemed to contradict himself by rejecting Mr. Thomas's statement that in any case the level would be lower than existing levels of nuclear delivery vehicles: and he rejected percentage reductions as a possible approach to the reduction process. He also attempted to distinguish between maximum and minimum levels.

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However, the level of deterrence depends on existing conditions. Under present conditions each State has made its own determination of its necessary deterrent. In the case of the United States that deterrent represents the minimum necessary for its security. The number of nuclear delivery vehicles may seem too high to some. But our security requirements and the existing military balance are not determined by numbers alone. Other factors, such as geography and types of weapons, including yield and invulnerability, must also be considered. Variations in concentration of industrial and population centres also play an important role in strategic planning.

The Soviet representative insists on talking of so-called "minimum levels". "Minimum" and "maximum" are, after all, terms which connote relative levels. They do not represent absolute figures. The question which we hope the working group will consider is how existing levels of nuclear delivery vehicles can be reduced while protecting the security of all parties.

Last week the Soviet representative also alleged that, according to Western figures on nuclear delivery vehicles, the Western disarmament plan would upset the balance of power in stage I. But the Soviet representative certainly realises that the rough military balance in the world today does not necessarily imply a numerical balance of each type of weapon. It is precisely for this reason that the Western plan is based on percentage reductions. This approach ensures balance because it allows States to maintain the armament mix they have chosen for their own defense structures.

Despite our differences, we believe that a working group can usefully study the levels of nuclear delivery vehicles to be retained during the disarmament process, and the elimination of all other stocks as soon as practicable in accordance with the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles. We do not accept that the group's work should be based exclusively on the principle of the Gromyko plan. However, there does seem to be a possibility of agreement on terms of reference, and we for our part will do everything possible to achieve such agreement.

Mr. LACHS (Poland): Before entering upon the substance of what I wish to say this morning, I should like to welcome, as other representatives have, the return of Mr. Tsarapkin to this table and to wish him success in his persevering efforts at disarmament.

(Mr. Lachs, Poland)

In taking the floor I wish to say only a few words on the proposal submitted by the Soviet representative, Mr. Zorin, concerning the setting up of a working group to discuss the so-called "nuclear umbrella" (ENDC/PV.188, p.17). In this connexion I should like to recall the statement made by him at our meeting on 23 June, in which he said:

"Actually the 'nuclear umbrella' is a minimum quantity of missiles with nuclear warheads which should be sufficient to deter any aggressor beforehand and would thus make it possible to eliminate all the remaining means of delivery in the earliest stage of disarmament. It is not by chance that some representatives call this a 'minimum deterrent'. It is precisely the minimum which should be sufficient to ensure the security of States during the disarmament process but should in no case give either of the sides the material possibility of unleashing and waging a nuclear war of aggression" (ENDC/PV.192, p.24).

The substance of that idea and the proposal behind it are clear. Therefore I can hardly agree with the United States representative who has just spoken when he says that the existing level of armaments in the United States is not excessive. That is incomprehensible to me. The suggestions he has just made, linking the whole issue to the problem of balance, amount to claims such as were frequently advanced in the past, in the days of the Treaty of Utrecht and the Congress of Vienna -- "Balance in my favour; restoration of the balance in my favour; changes of balance in my favour". That is not the objective we have in mind. However, as I have said, I wish to address myself this morning to the procedural issue only.

We are convinced that the acceptance of an agreed basis for the working group would enable it to consider, discuss and study all suggestions and proposals within definite terms of reference. That in turn would offer an opportunity to make some progress in the work of our Committee, and to do so indeed in a field which is of the utmost importance to the whole issue of general and complete disarmament. That is why we were so gratified to hear several other delegations express favourable views on the procedure suggested. However, as we have noted during the discussion at the last meeting and today, the Western delegations seem to be reluctant to take such a step. The objection was raised that the working group could not deal with the aspects of a proposal seen from one side only. Hence

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their suggestion that the terms of reference should be extended to include --

"Disarmament measures in regard to nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, including the problems pertaining to the production of such vehicles, together with appropriate control measures...."

(ENDC/52, para.5(b))

That is really surprising, because we recall that in the past those delegations requested clarification and detailed discussion concerning the Soviet proposal, particularly with regard to the number of missiles to be left, means of control and so on. Now, when the possibility of such a discussion and elaboration of the concrete issues involved arises, a different approach is taken. I said that one could be surprised. Indeed one could be astonished; for is it not clear that, if the working group engages in discussion on more than one issue, there is little possibility that its work will bear fruit?

The very idea of a working group is to concentrate on one issue and on one issue only. Indeed, this could pave the way to constructive exchanges of views which could lead to agreed decisions. If we insist that it cover more than one topic, we shall make the working group face a situation similar to that in this Committee itself.

This morning I listened with great interest -- as indeed I always do -- to the representative of Italy. I was glad to hear him state that the Western Powers did not claim a monopoly of wisdom. That was very comforting. But when he proceeded to enumerate the problems to be studied by the working group, he suggested a very large programme of work -- almost encyclopaedic -- which contradicts the very concept of a working group. I would even suggest that such a programme for a working group is a contradiction in terms. In fact, as I said earlier, the working group would be doing the same work as this Committee. In that case, the question arises: why a working group? If it were to continue in the same way as this Committee, there would be little likelihood of its serving a useful purpose. What is more, we face the danger that the whole idea of working groups will be compromised and that the concept of the working group will lose its real value.

We see in the Soviet proposal a constructive move which may allow us to break the deadlock in which we find ourselves. One is bound to ask: why reject this chance? Why not use all possible means to make progress? Procedural considerations and reason itself dictate acceptance of the Soviet proposal. You, Mr. Chairman,

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in your capacity as representative of Mexico, dwelt on this subject at some length this morning. To negotiate means to abandon self-righteousness, to accept the reasonable proposals of the other side, to yield to convincing arguments and to be ready to accept them in the common interest.

The Soviet Union has shown this spirit of compromise, and it is now for the Western Powers to do the same; for here we face a situation where an illustration of the spirit of compromise could and should be given. Let us accept the Soviet proposal, set up a working group, and begin discussion of the various elements involved, as suggested by Mr. Zorin on 23 June (ENDC/PV.192, p.26). No one will be the loser. Indeed, our work will gain. Thus the cause of disarmament itself will move forward. Therefore my delegation would urge the Western delegations to go along this road and accept the proposal concerning a working group submitted by the Soviet Union.

Mr. TSARAPKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): I should like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, and all the delegations concerned for your words of welcome, and to assure you that the Soviet delegation will spare no efforts to render our negotiations fruitful. Unfortunately, however, that does not depend solely on us.

I should like to stress that the statement which you made, Mr. Chairman, in your capacity as representative of Mexico contains a number of interesting ideas. We shall study your statement with the greatest care, and I do not think we shall be slow in reacting to it. I should like to note the well-reasoned statements made by the representatives of Poland and Romania, which likewise contain interesting ideas to which the members of the Committee should give careful thought. As for the statements made today by the representatives of Italy, Canada and the United States, I regret to say that they do not contain anything new, but they certainly deserve an answer from us. We shall try to give it after we have studied the statements in the verbatim record.

The CHAIRMAN (Mexico) (translation from Spanish): Since no one else wishes to speak, I shall read out a text agreed on by our two co-Chairmen. As there is no official Spanish translation at the moment, I shall read it out in the language in which it was given to me:

(The Chairman, Mexico)

(continued in English)

"If the Committee believes it useful to have the co-Chairmen, as proposed by certain delegations, work on the development of an agreed basis for the working group the question of the creation of which arose in connexion with the current discussion in plenary meetings of the elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in the process of general and complete disarmament, the co-Chairmen are prepared to do so. They intend to report to the Committee on the results of their work at the next meeting devoted to general and complete disarmament."

(continued in Spanish)

If there are no objections, all that remains for us is to wish the co-Chairmen every success.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 196th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador Gomez Robledo, representative of Mexico.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Mexico, Romania, Italy, Canada, the United States, Poland and the Soviet Union.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 9 July 1964, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.

